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Demographics of inceldom: Difference between revisions
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South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world, with a TFR (total fertility rate) of 0.81 in 2021, compared to the general population replacement rate of 2.1 (replacing the parents plus a country specific adjustment for child mortality rates). The rate has fluctuated around that level for the past few years, likely plunging to the nadir of the current lowest-ever rate in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/world/asia/south-korea-fertility-rate.html</ref> | South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world, with a TFR (total fertility rate) of 0.81 in 2021, compared to the general population replacement rate of 2.1 (replacing the parents plus a country specific adjustment for child mortality rates). The rate has fluctuated around that level for the past few years, likely plunging to the nadir of the current lowest-ever rate in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/world/asia/south-korea-fertility-rate.html</ref> | ||
A high cost of living, a strenuous and | A high cost of living, a strenuous and extremely competitive education system, declines in social solidarity, increases in female education, increasing pessimism, the rise of the 'gig economy', [[Social epistasis amplification model|dysgenics]], female hypergamy,<ref>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11113-021-09672-5</ref> and a growing militant feminist reaction against Korea's generally patriarchal Confucian marriage culture<ref>https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1177439.shtml</ref><ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/40378774</ref> have all been proposed as potential explanations for this decline in fertility. | ||
Like in other developed economies, declines in fertility in South Korea have been associated with a greater age at reproduction, longer spaces between generations, and smaller family sizes. There has also been a general shift where Korean women, who, even after the demographic transition shifted Korea to sub-replacement fertility, previously had very high rates of childbirth across their lifetimes combined with smaller families centered around two children, are increasingly childless for life.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/26457056?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref> | Like in other developed economies, declines in fertility in South Korea have been associated with a greater age at reproduction, longer spaces between generations, and smaller family sizes. There has also been a general shift where Korean women, who, even after the demographic transition shifted Korea to sub-replacement fertility, previously had very high rates of childbirth across their lifetimes combined with smaller families centered around two children, are increasingly childless for life.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/26457056?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref> | ||