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Demographics of inceldom: Difference between revisions
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It can be averred that the Korean men who import foreign brides are generally men that are more likely to be sexless otherwise, as they are more often older men with a lower level of educational attainment. South Korea is one of the most educated countries in the world and it has mirrored the general trend in developed countries for women to become more educated than men over time, judging by enrollment rates in higher educated broken down by sex.<ref>https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/gender-equality-korea-has-come-a-long-way-but-there-is-more-work-to-do-8bb81613/</ref> | It can be averred that the Korean men who import foreign brides are generally men that are more likely to be sexless otherwise, as they are more often older men with a lower level of educational attainment. South Korea is one of the most educated countries in the world and it has mirrored the general trend in developed countries for women to become more educated than men over time, judging by enrollment rates in higher educated broken down by sex.<ref>https://www.oecd.org/country/korea/thematic-focus/gender-equality-korea-has-come-a-long-way-but-there-is-more-work-to-do-8bb81613/</ref> | ||
Indeed, Raymo & Park (2020) found that declines in marriage rates for lower-educated men were more driven by changes in marital market composition (more educated) compared to more highly educated men, and that the increasing tendency for men of low SES (as judged by education) to seek marriage with foreign women helped to flatten the decline in marriage that would've occurred in that cohort based on their projections. The increasing trend to import foreign brides made little difference to marriage trends for highly educated men.<ref>https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7382948/</ref> | Indeed, Raymo & Park (2020) found that declines in marriage rates for lower-educated men were more driven by changes in marital market composition (more educated women) compared to more highly educated men, and that the increasing tendency for men of low SES (as judged by education) to seek marriage with foreign women helped to flatten the decline in marriage that would've occurred in that cohort based on their projections. The increasing trend to import foreign brides made little difference to marriage trends for highly educated men.<ref>https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7382948/</ref> | ||
As noted above, Korean men also import wives from countries that are comparatively poorer than South Korea at a higher rate, while women (who marry those of foreign citizenship less) are more likely to marry men from countries such as the United States (it is claimed that these are mostly ethnic Koreans).<ref>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_in_Korea#Marriages_between_Koreans_and_non-Koreans/</ref> | As noted above, Korean men also import wives from countries that are comparatively poorer than South Korea at a higher rate, while women (who marry those of foreign citizenship less) are more likely to marry men from countries such as the United States (it is claimed that these are mostly ethnic Koreans).<ref>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marriage_in_Korea#Marriages_between_Koreans_and_non-Koreans/</ref> | ||
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The number of South Korean men married to foreign women has more than doubled from 2007-2019,<ref>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57716704</ref> and some local governments in South Korea grant subsidies to men who seek foreign brides in an effort to ameliorate South Korea's low fertility rate crisis.<ref>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48917935</ref> This increase in Korean men married to foreign women has occurred despite increased regulation of the foreign marriage broker industry, partly in response to concerns surrounding human trafficking and the widespread abuse of foreign-born wives by the Korean men who are married to them,<ref>https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/how-south-korean-demographics-are-affecting-immigration-and-social-change-pub-84819</ref> though some have criticized the lax nature of these regulations and claimed that the drive to increase the low birthrates in Korea continues to be a prevailing concern for South Korean policymakers in this area.<ref>https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/901613.html</ref> | The number of South Korean men married to foreign women has more than doubled from 2007-2019,<ref>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-57716704</ref> and some local governments in South Korea grant subsidies to men who seek foreign brides in an effort to ameliorate South Korea's low fertility rate crisis.<ref>https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-48917935</ref> This increase in Korean men married to foreign women has occurred despite increased regulation of the foreign marriage broker industry, partly in response to concerns surrounding human trafficking and the widespread abuse of foreign-born wives by the Korean men who are married to them,<ref>https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/29/how-south-korean-demographics-are-affecting-immigration-and-social-change-pub-84819</ref> though some have criticized the lax nature of these regulations and claimed that the drive to increase the low birthrates in Korea continues to be a prevailing concern for South Korean policymakers in this area.<ref>https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/901613.html</ref> | ||
In terms of proportionate amounts, the amount of new marriages involving Korean men married to foreign born brides has been stagnant since the late 2000s. | In terms of proportionate amounts, the amount of new marriages involving Korean men married to foreign born brides has been stagnant since the late 2000s. | ||
====Low fertility==== | |||
South Korea has the lowest fertility rate in the world, with a TFR (total fertility rate) of 0.81 in 2021, compared to the general population replacement rate of 2.1 (replacing the parents plus a country specific adjustment for child mortality rates). The rate has fluctuated around that level for the past few years, likely plunging to the nadir of the current lowest-ever rate likely in response to the Covid-19 pandemic.<ref>https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/24/world/asia/south-korea-fertility-rate.html</ref> | |||
A high cost of living, a strenuous and extreme competitive education system, declines in social solidarity, increases in female education, increasing pessimism, the rise of the 'gig economy', [[Social epistasis amplification model|dysgenics]], female hypergamy,<ref>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11113-021-09672-5</ref> and a growing militant feminist reaction against Korea's generally patriarchal Confucian marriage culture<ref>https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1177439.shtml</ref><ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/40378774</ref> have all been proposed as potential explanations for this decline in fertility. | |||
Like in other developed economies, declines in fertility in South Korea have been associated with a greater age at reproduction, longer spaces between generations, and smaller family sizes. There has also been a general shift where Korean women, who, even after the demographic transition shifted Korea to sub-replacement fertility, previously had very high rates of childbirth across their lifetimes combined with smaller families centered around two children, are increasingly childless for life.<ref>https://www.jstor.org/stable/26457056?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents</ref> | |||
The South Korean government, treating the low fertility rate as a crisis that threatens to weaken the economy via the tax burden of an aging population and labor shortages, has attempted to increase marriage rates and therefore birthrates via various incentives. | |||
The most ambitious of these was a program launched in 2006 which aimed to boost the TFR to 1.6 by 2020, which has been an abject failure.<ref>https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-21482-5_6</ref> | |||
Other initiatives were launched in 2010 and 2016, respectively. Such initiatives were focused primarily on financially incentivizing reproduction. This has been proposed to be an overly narrow approach which ignores important sociological factors, hence the failure of these policies. Park (2020) argues that policies that focus on providing cost of living support, promoting work-life balance and measures to encourage social cohesion and integration, as has been attempted to varying degrees of success across Japan, would be more adequate in helping to alleviate the increasing social burden of South Korea's period of 'lowest low' fertility.<ref>https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s12126-020-09365-y</ref> | |||
===Switzerland=== | ===Switzerland=== | ||