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Peterson regards country borders and social norms as fundamental for a functioning state, but admits there also needs to be some adaptability and flow of information (free speech, ''classical liberalism'') to avoid totalitarianism and warfare. He claims it is naive to assume there is a definite set of rules for ideally structuring a state (ideology), except for leaving up the determination of the rules to a competitive, democratic process, a free market of ideas. For this reason, men need to be socialized to be competitive and dependable, in addition to be able to satisfy women's hypergamous preferences and to be immune against the natural occurrence of [[asshole|psychopaths]] who would otherwise claim power. He also sees cultural norms that encourage telling the truth and admitting primacy to the individual as essential for social stability, and as main reason for the success of Western civilization since this enables cooperation and economic growth. For this reason, Peterson is wary of automation, fearing it could diminish the value of the individual being outcompeted by machines. | Peterson regards country borders and social norms as fundamental for a functioning state, but admits there also needs to be some adaptability and flow of information (free speech, ''classical liberalism'') to avoid totalitarianism and warfare. He claims it is naive to assume there is a definite set of rules for ideally structuring a state (ideology), except for leaving up the determination of the rules to a competitive, democratic process, a free market of ideas. For this reason, men need to be socialized to be competitive and dependable, in addition to be able to satisfy women's hypergamous preferences and to be immune against the natural occurrence of [[asshole|psychopaths]] who would otherwise claim power. He also sees cultural norms that encourage telling the truth and admitting primacy to the individual as essential for social stability, and as main reason for the success of Western civilization since this enables cooperation and economic growth. For this reason, Peterson is wary of automation, fearing it could diminish the value of the individual being outcompeted by machines. | ||
This concludes the secular side. Peterson also has a series of esoteric views about so called ''Jungian archetypes'' that he believes to have emerged in human folklore and religious scripture. He believes these archetypes to exist across time and space, and to have been shaped by gene-meme co-evolution (drawing on Jung's concept of the collective unconscious) to capture deeper truths about human nature than a typical atheist would assume. | This concludes the secular side. Peterson also has a series of esoteric views about so called ''Jungian archetypes'' that he believes to have emerged in human folklore and religious scripture. He believes these archetypes to exist across time and space, and to have been shaped by gene-meme co-evolution (drawing on Jung's concept of the collective unconscious) to capture deeper truths about human nature than a typical contemporary atheist would assume. | ||
Peterson sees for example the primacy of the individual in Western culture and the emphasis on honesty to have emerged in such a cultural evolutionary process. He sees this framework of human culture as fundamental for the construction of ''any'' meaning, and uses it to justify the importance of traditions. This is very similar to the traditionalist argument famously employed by the English Catholic writer G.K Chesteron, known as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._K._Chesterton#Chesterton's_fence Chesterton's Fence], which is that one should fully know the purpose a tradition or cultural institution was originally intended to fulfill before one demolishes or reforms it. Thus one could view traditions as a form of "cultural technology". From this concept, he concludes the [[blackpill]] that culture protects us from the unknown ways of organizing society that could potentially throw us into chaos by mechanisms that are too complex for us to figure out by other means but cultural evolution: | Peterson sees for example the primacy of the individual in Western culture and the emphasis on honesty to have emerged in such a cultural evolutionary process. He sees this framework of human culture as fundamental for the construction of ''any'' meaning, and uses it to justify the importance of traditions. This is very similar to the traditionalist argument famously employed by the English Catholic writer G.K Chesteron, known as [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G._K._Chesterton#Chesterton's_fence Chesterton's Fence], which is that one should fully know the purpose a tradition or cultural institution was originally intended to fulfill before one demolishes or reforms it. Thus one could view traditions as a form of "cultural technology". From this concept, he concludes the [[blackpill]] that culture protects us from the unknown ways of organizing society that could potentially throw us into chaos by mechanisms that are too complex for us to figure out by other means but cultural evolution: | ||
{{Quote|Something we cannot see protects us from something we do not understand. The thing we cannot see is culture, in its intrapsychic or internal manifestation. The thing we do not understand is the chaos that gave rise to culture. If the structure of culture is disrupted, unwittingly, chaos returns. We will do anything–anything–to defend ourselves against that return.|Jordan Peterson, 1998 (Descensus ad Inferos)}} | {{Quote|Something we cannot see protects us from something we do not understand. The thing we cannot see is culture, in its intrapsychic or internal manifestation. The thing we do not understand is the chaos that gave rise to culture. If the structure of culture is disrupted, unwittingly, chaos returns. We will do anything–anything–to defend ourselves against that return.|Jordan Peterson, 1998 (Descensus ad Inferos)}} | ||
A main mechanism by which he believes chaos to occur is when important beliefs are suddenly challenged (e.g. during a loss of culture or religion). Then the negative human emotional response to this tends to be externalized as aggression, since people "prefer war to be something external, than re-forming [their] challenged beliefs". He sees this to be driven by the most fundamental drive of human cognition, especially male cognition, which is the drive to transform chaos into order. (In this case, people attempt to restore order in the world by force, rather than in their belief system.) He sees much of the world wars and cold wars to be driven by this | A main mechanism by which he believes chaos to occur is when important beliefs are suddenly challenged (e.g. during a loss of culture or religion). Then the negative human emotional response to this tends to be externalized as aggression, since people "prefer war to be something external, than re-forming [their] challenged beliefs". He sees this to be driven by the most fundamental drive of human cognition, especially male cognition, which is the drive to transform chaos into order. (In this case, people attempt to restore order in the world by force, rather than in their belief system.) He sees much of the world wars and cold wars to be driven by this mechanism, with people externalizing their disagreement about collectivist vs individualist orders of society as aggression. Of course other things cause chaos and conflict as well, e.g. when people cease to have incentives to cooperate and end up in downward spiral of resentment, blaming and revenge, often based on group affiliation which likely ties into tribal instincts (identity politics). In major situations of conflict, he says, people lose the value of the individual and prefer dead over living matter, he says this happens when a group becomes more important than the individual. He claims all major atrocities in human history have been committed by ordinary people who would have been honorable in different historic contexts and with different incentives. | ||
== Criticism == | == Criticism == |